Towards Enhanced Security for Automotive Operating Systems
Modern automotive infotainment systems are represented by highly complex components with broad functionality and network capabilities. As a result, they are becoming more exposed to the outer world, thus turning into potentially lucrative targets for remote cyber attacks. In the worst case scenario, an attacker could gain complete control over critical vehicle’s systems, for instance, steering, braking, engine, etc. This thesis proposes security hardening features based on ARM’s TrustZone technology for infotainment systems that ensures confidentiality and integrity of critical applications. In addition, we present a technique that allows to mitigate the impact of certain attacks on the car’s internal network. In contrast to existing solutions, our security features do not require separate hardware and can be implemented on the same system-on-chip as an infotainment system. Finally, we evaluated the implemented approach and demonstrated its capabilities to successfully mitigate potential attack vectors created by a compromised operating system, specifically, fake input injection, screen capture, and overlay attacks.