Show simple item record

dc.contributor.advisorSilaghi, Marius
dc.contributor.authorNzouonta, Josiane Domgang
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-05T20:41:03Z
dc.date.available2013-11-05T20:41:03Z
dc.date.issued2003-12-15
dc.identifier.citationNzouonta, J.D. (2003). An algorithm for clearing combinatorial markets (CS-2003-23). Melbourne, FL. Florida Institute of Technologyen_US
dc.identifier.otherCS-2003-23
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11141/130
dc.descriptionA thesis submitted to the Graduate School of Florida Institute of Technology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Computer Scienceen_US
dc.description.abstractIt was recently shown possible to solve single item auctions without revealing any secret except for the solution. Namely, with vMB-share [4], the seller and the buyer only learn each other's identity and the selling price for a chosen M+1 pricing scheme. No trusted party was necessary. In this thesis, we show how vMB-share can be extended for the clearing of combinatorial negotiations with several items, buyers and sellers. We first show how the more general problem can be reduced to a virtual form, relatively similar to the single-item auctions. Then, some modifications in the cryptographic techniques of vMB-share are made such that it can offer a solution to problems in virtual form. While the problem is known to be NP-complete, a secure multiparty computation that avoids the secrets leak by measuring computation time necessarily takes an exponential computation cost. Some early experiments show that small realistic negotiations can nevertheless be solved with acceptable effort.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsCopyright held by author.en_US
dc.titleAn algorithm for clearing combinatorial marketsen_US
dc.typeTechnical Reporten_US


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record